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Veith: The Judicial Bypass Procedure and Adolescents' Abortion Rights: T

NOTE
THE JUDICIAL BYPASS PROCEDURE AND
ADOLESCENTS' ABORTION RIGHTS: THE
FALLACY OF THE "MATURITY" STANDARD
I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1979, six years after Roe v. Wade' laid down the guidelines

for constitutional protection of a woman's right to choose an abor-

tion,2 the Supreme Court had still not settled on a formula which
would express the extent to which the Constitution protected the
abortion rights of pregnant teenagers. In the 1976 case of Planned
Parenthood v. Danforth,3 the Court rejected a Missouri statute that

required an unmarried minor to obtain the consent of a parent before
having an abortion.4 Yet the decision was only five to four,' and
even the majority hinted that a less restrictive statute might be acceptable.6
In 1979, Bellotti v. Baird invalidated a Massachusetts parental
consent statute, even though the statute provided that a teenager who

1. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
2. See infra note 118 (outlining the "trimester" framework through which Roe balances
the rights of the woman, the state, and the fetus).
3. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
4. Id. at 74. The majority held that, after Roe, the state may not grant a third party
the right to "an absolute, and possibly arbitrary, veto over the [minor's] decision." Id.
5. Id. at 54. The majority opinion was written by Justice Blackmun; Justice Stewart
concurred joined by Justice Powell. Justice White, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice
Rehnquist, concurred in part and dissented in part, as did Justice Stevens. See infra note 6
(discussing dissent theories).
6. Id at 75 (stating that the "holding . . . does not suggest that every minor, regardless of age or maturity, may give effective consent for termination of her pregnancy").
Justice White dissented on the ground that a requirement of "parental consultation and
consent" for important decisions was the traditional method states have used to protect minors
from their immaturity. Id. at 95 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice
Stevens found that Roe emphasized the importance of the abortion decision and thus the
importance of assuring that a young woman will make a correct decision; it was "not irrational" for the legislature to determine that parental advice would make that more likely. Id. at
103 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
7. 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
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could not obtain the consent of her parents could attempt to obtain a
court order authorizing the abortion "for good cause shown."8 In a
sense, however, the most significant aspect of Bellotti lay in dicta in
the plurality opinion written by Justice Lewis Powell.9 While finding
the statute unacceptable, Powell assisted future legislatures desiring to

require parental involvement in the abortion decisions of teenagers by
describing the kind of alternative route to authorization, or "bypass

option," that would make such a statute constitutional."t The Bellotti
bypass procedure became the basis for current constitutional law on
abortion rights of minors. The Court has since upheld several parental
consent1 and notification 12 statutes that include some version of the
Bellotti bypass procedure.
Essentially, the Bellotti bypass procedure is a compr6mise between the traditional legal deference to parental authority over important decisions of minors 3 and the view that the right to choose abor-

tion should accompany the condition of pregnancy, regardless of the
age of the pregnant woman.'" The procedure centers on the concept

of "maturity": the state may not mandate parental or judicial approval

8. Id. at 625 (Powell, J.,plurality opinion) (quoting MASS GEN LAWS ANN., ch. 112,
§ 125 (West 1983)). Four justices believed that this would violate the Danforth rule that
prohibited a blanket third party veto over the abortion decisions of minors. Id. at 654
(Stevens, J.,concurring in the judgment) (joined by Justices Brennan, Blackmun, and Marshall).
9. Justice Powell was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart and
Rehnquist. However, Justice Rehnquist made it clear in a separate concurrence that he went
along with the Powell opinion solely to provide guidance to lower courts. Id. at 651-52
(Rehnquist, J., concurring).
10. Id. at 643-44 (Powell, J.,plurality opinion).
11. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2832 (1992) (upholding an
informed parental consent requirement where a minor could substitute a court order); Planned
Parenthood v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 490-93 (1983) (upholding a requirement that a minor
receive consent of one parent or a juvenile court judge). But see City of Akron v. Akron
Center for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 439-42 (1983) (rejecting a prohibition of abortions on minors under fifteen without consent of one parent or a court order; a majority
found that the statute did not adequately provide for the case-by-case evaluation of maturity
called for by the Bellotti guidelines).
12. Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990) (upholding a requirement of notice to
both parents in addition to a court authorized abortion without parental consent); Ohio v.
Akron Center for Reprod. Health, Inc., 497 U.S. 502 (1990) (upholding a requirement of notice to one parent where a minor could substitute a court order).
For a detailed discussion of Ohio v. Akron Center for Reprod. Health, Inc. and
Hodgson v. Minnesota, see infra notes 99-113 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 54-62 and accompanying text (discussing deference to parental authority and the rationale behind it).
14. See infra notes 120-23 and accompanying text (citing the proponents of this view).
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of the abortion decisions of all pregnant teenagers, because the
"unique nature" of the abortion decision"5 requires that "mature"
teenagers be allowed to make that choice themselves. In other words,
in the case of abortion, the presumption that all teenagers are unable
to make important decisions for themselves must be replaced by a

case-by-case determination of "maturity."' 6
In a skeletal outline, the procedure works like this:'7 state legis-

latures may require an unmarried pregnant teenager to obtain parental
consent or give parental notice before having an abortion, as long as
they also provide the teenager an alternative route through the

courts."8 This "judicial bypass procedure" must allow a minor to
"bypass" her parents and go directly to court.' 9 There, a judge must
determine whether or not the minor has sufficient "maturity" to decide for herself to have an abortion. No definition of "maturity" or
guidelines for its determination have been supplied by the Court in
Bellotti or any subsequent case.' If the judge determines that a teen-

ager is "mature," she receives judicial recognition of her maturity for
the purposes of the abortion decision, not judicial consent. If the
judge finds that a teenager lacks the "maturity" to make the abortion

decision alone, she must still be allowed to get an abortion without

15. Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 642-43 (Powell, J., plurality opinion) (explaining that because
of the need for a quick decision and the potential far-reaching consequences, abortion is different from other decisions a minor may face).
16. Id. at 643-44.
17. In subsequent cases, the Court has allowed legislatures to elaborate on this outlined
procedure in various ways. See infra notes 99-113 and accompanying text for a discussion of
two of these cases.
18. There is no legal requirement that the decision be made by a judge, however, relevant legislation has cast judges in this role. See infra note 20 for examples of these statutes.
19. This is one of the main ways in which the procedure differs from the one rejected
in Bellotti. The proposed statute would have required a teenager to attempt to obtain her
parents' consent first; only if they refused could she attempt to receive a judicial waiver for
"good cause." Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 625 (Powell, J., plurality opinion) (quoting MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN., ch. 112, § 125 (west 1983)).
20. See Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 647-48. States are of course free to supply guidelines of
their own. One of the most detailed of such guidelines is Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.028.2(2)-(3)
(Vernon 1983) (outlining bypass procedure in parental consent provision), "the court shall
hear evidence relating to the emotional development, maturity, intellect and understanding of
the minor.
...
Id. § 188.028.2(3); see also KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 311.732(3)(e) (Michie.
1994) (using similar language to describe the bypass procedure and parental consent provisions). As one commentator suggests, guidelines such as these "fail to provide much help to
courts." Wendy Anton Fitzgerald, Maturity, Difference, and Mystery: Children's Perspectives
and the Law, 36 ARIZ. L. REV. 11, 86 n.499 (1994). For more examples of elaborations on
the Bellotti requirement in the bypass procedures of parental consent and notice statutes, see
infra note 89.
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parental involvement if the judge determines that it is in her best
2
interests. '
The aim of this Note is to show the weakness of assumptions
and associations that help to support the "maturity" standard which is
at the center of the bypass procedure, in the face of the abundant
evidence that the procedure itself does substantial harm to those it
alleges to protect-pregnant teenagers. Part II focuses on this evidence by showing that the bypass procedure is based on questionable
assumptions about the ability of teenagers to make important decisions, that the procedure is pointless on its own terms because it does
not result in a change of outcome-minors are almost never denied
the right to choose an abortion-and, further, that the procedure is in
itself a burden which inconveniences, endangers, and humiliates pregnant teenagers with no apparent benefit to them.
Part Hm attempts to understand the "success" of the bypass procedure in becoming current constitutional law by exploring the roots of
the "mature/immature" minor distinction in the ideology of the privacy right, theories of parental and state authority over children, and
common attitudes about adults, children, and "maturity." The bypass
procedure gains legitimacy because it requires case-by-case determination of the "maturity" of pregnant minors who seek judicial approval
for an abortion. This appears, at first, to be a welcome refinement of
the pres'umption that "maturity" coincides with attainment of a certain
chronological age. Though our legal system grants full legal autonomy to persons who arrive at adulthood, we are all aware that people
of all ages beyond infancy vary widely in their ability and inclination
to take care of themselves and others. The reliance on "maturity" and
individual hearings seems humane and appeals to our instincts about
adults and children and the need to protect the latter. But this very
appeal makes it easier to ignore the actual consequences of the procedure in the lives of those it is supposedly devised to protect.
Part IV examines the true achievement of the bypass procedure.
As shown by two recent Supreme Court decisions 2 upholding oppressive regulation of abortion rights of minors, the bypass procedure
allows legislators opposed to abortion to place burdens on the preg-

21. See Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 643-45 (Powell, J., plurality opinion) (outlining provisions
of proposed bypass procedure).
22. Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990) (upholding a requirement of notice to
both parents where a minor could substitute a court order); Ohio v. Akron Center for
Reprod. Health, Inc., 497 U.S. 502 (1990) (upholding a requirement of notice to both parents
where a minor could substitute a court order).
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nant teenagers seeking abortion that they are not allowed to place on
pregnant adults. Finally, part V suggests that it would be more just,

though not an ideal or complete solution to the problems of pregnant
teenagers, to extend abortion rights to them on the same basis as to
adults: the only prerequisite for the right to choose abortion should be
the condition of pregnancy.
I.

THE JuDICIAL BYPASS PROCEDURE: A SENSELESS BURDEN

The case-by-case determination of maturity called for by the
judicial bypass procedure applies, of course, only to pregnant minors.
Pregnant adults need not demonstrate their "maturity" before obtaining
an abortion. This distinction is supposedly founded on the assumption
that minors are less able than adults to make intelligent decisions.'
However, studies of adolescent and adult decision-making indicate that teenagers are as competent as adults in making decisions
about medical treatment in general24 and abortion in particular.'
Differences in the way adolescents make decisions seem to derive not
from lack of ability but from their social role as dependents,'s a role
which is only reinforced by mandated interference of adults in their
abortion decision. Evidence also indicates that though teenagers are

23. Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 640 (Powell, J., plurality opinion) (explaining that parental
notice or consent may typically be required by the state for a minor's important decisions
because "immature minors often lack the ability to make fully informed choices that take
account of both immediate and long-range consequences").
24. Interdivisional Committee on Adolescent Abortion, American Psychological Association, Adolescent Abortion: Psychological and Legal Issues, AM. PSYCHOLOGIST, Jan. 1987, at
73 [hereinafter Interdivisional Committee] (citing several studies and concluding that "available
evidence . . . suggests that adolescents are as able to conceptualize and reason about treatment alternatives as adults are").
25. Catherine C. Lewis, Minors' Competence to Consent to Abortion, AM. PSYCHOLOGIST, Jan. 1987, at 84, 87 (summarizing results of several studies of adolescent decision-making and concluding that, though larger studies are needed, the current state of "psychological
research gives no basis for restrictions on minors' privacy in decision making on the ground
of competence alone").
26. Id. Lewis finds that the limited evidence available suggests that minors are as competent as adults in making pregnancy or birth control decisions and that differences in the
performance of minors may result from the social and familial roles assigned to them. In
other words, adolescents will make thoughtful decisions if they are allowed and encouraged to
do so; see also Sigmund E. Dragastin, Research Themes and Priorities, in ADOLESCENCE IN
THE LIFE CYCLE: PSYCHOLOGICAL CHANGE AND SOCIAL CONTEXT 291, 296 (Sigmund E.
Dragastin & Glen H. Elder, Jr. eds., 1975) (quoting a researcher as suggesting that the "main
difference in cognitive maturity in adolescents and adults may relate to levels of social participation: the picture one has for himself of what he is authorized to do and empowered to do
and responsible for doing in particular situations").
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somewhat more likely than adults to suffer negative reactions following abortions, these reactions are "generally mild. 27

Nevertheless, it is difficult to imagine that a twelve- or thirteenyear-old who becomes pregnant will always be as prepared to handle
the decision of whether or not to have the child as an adult woman
or even a seventeen-year-old. There is something disturbing in the
image of a young child struggling with the realization that she is
pregnant and seeking out an abortionist alone or with equally young
friends; there is something appalling about a society that permits this
to happen. However, the bypass procedure is not designed to offer

such girls genuine comfort, advice, or support.28 Judges are not required or equipped to offer advice or counselling; the hearing is essentially a brief, forced appearance29 based on which a teenager is,

in effect, either given or-very rarely-denied permission to have an
abortion.3" Further, it is a procedure that, from the perspective of the
child, appears as just another difficulty to be faced alone.3 Many
pregnant teenagers, particularly younger ones, voluntarily consult at
least one parent,32 and one survey reports that judges, lawyers and

27. Nancy E. Adler & Peggy Dolcini, Psychological Issues in Abortion for Adolescents,
in ADOLESCENT ABORTION: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND LEGAL ISSUES 74, 84-87 (Gary B. Melton
ed., 1986). The authors cite studies that show that negative reactions to an abortion are more
likely when the teenager feels she has not made the decision freely but has been pressured
by others. Id. at 88; see also Interdivisional Committee, supra note 24, at 74 (citing studies
that show adolescents' negative feelings following abortion are "mild and transitory" and that
the most common feeling of both adults and teenagers is relief).
28. See Hodgson v. Minnesota, 648 F. Supp. 756, 766 (Minn. 1986) (reporting that
Minnesota judges who administer the bypass procedure find it has no positive effect on teenagers).
29. See Gary B. Melton, Legal Regulation of Adolescent Abortion-Unintended Effects,
AM. PSYCHOLOGIST, Jan. 1987, at 79, 80 [hereinafter Melton, Unintended Effects) (citing report that shows hearings are typically less than fifteen minutes long and experts rarely testify).
30. See infra note 36 (citing results of three surveys of the outcomes of judicial bypass
procedures).
31. See Hodgson, 648 F. Supp. at 763 (describing the guilt and shame experienced by
many young women who undergo the bypass procedure).
32. Surveys of the behavior of teenagers indicate that many, especially younger ones,
voluntarily consult at least one parent prior to obtaining an abortion. See Freddie Clary, Minor Women Obtaining Abortions: A Study of Parental Notification in a Metropolitan Area,
AM. J. PUB. HEALTH, Mar. 1982, at 283, 284 (reporting, based on a study of 141 teenagers
who attended a clinic that did not require notification, that a "substantial minority" had informed their parents beforehand-37% told their mothers, 26% their fathers-and that younger
teenagers were more likely to have told a parent than older ones); Raye Hudson Rosen,
Adolescent Pregnancy Decision-Making: Are Parents Important?, ADOLESCENCE, Spring 1980,
at 43, 46 (finding that out of 432 unmarried Michigan teenagers surveyed, 57% had consulted
at least one parent before making a final decision on how to handle the pregnancy and over
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others who administer the procedure believe that forcing a teenager

who feels she cannot consult with her parents33 to appear in court
does nothing to improve parent-child communication.'
Further, even if one believes that teenagers should be required to
prove their "maturity" before carrying out a decision to have an abortion, the judicial bypass procedure still is not justified. The ultimate
point of the procedure on its own terms is to deny the "immature"
minor an abortion because it is somehow in her best interests to be

forced to bear a child against her will. As Justice Thurgood Marshall
commented, "It is difficult to conceive of any reason, aside from a

judge's personal opposition to abortion, that would justify a finding
that an immature woman's best interests would be served by forcing
her to endure pregnancy and childbirth against her will."35 In fact,

half reported that their mother influenced their decision); Aida Torres et al., Telling Parents:
Clinic Policies and Adolescents' Use of Family Planning and Abortion Services, FAM. PLAN.
PERsP., Nov.-Dec. 1980, at 284, 287-90 (reporting that out of 1,170 unmarried teenaged abortion patients, 55% discussed the abortion with parents prior to the procedure, 38% initiated it;
75% of those age 15 or younger consulted with parents, 46% initiated it).
33. See Clary, supra note 32, at 234. The most common reason teenagers chose not to
inform their parents was fear of disappointing the parents or causing embarrassment. Id.
Though from an adult perspective this may seem trivial or "childish," it can have tragic
consequences. See Allison B. Hubbard, Recent Development, The Erosion of Minors' Abortion
Rights: An Analysis of Hodgson v Minnesota and Ohio v. Akron Center for Reprod. Health,
I UCLA L.J. 227 (1991) (describing a teenager who died from an illegal abortion rather than
"disappoint" her parents). Approximately 30% feared hostile reactions, including violence and
being prevented from having the abortion. Clary, supra note 32, at 284. As Clary and others
have pointed out, it is not possible to assess how accurate teenagers' fear of negative parental reactions actually are. Id.; Gary B. Melton & Anita J. Pliner, Adolescent Abortion: A
Psycholegal Analysis, in ADOLESCENT ABORTION: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND LEGAL ISSUES 1, 2021 (Gary B. Melton ed., 1986). However, as has also been pointed out, the perception of
parental hostility, if combined with legislation requiring parental involvement and other obstacles to abortion such as the judicial bypass, may cause teenagers to have unwanted children
thus adding to social problems associated with teenage pregnancy, Clary, supra note 32, at
284-85, and can cause teenagers to delay obtaining an abortion, thus adding to medical and
emotional risks of pregnancy. Melton & Pliner, supra at 21.
34. Patricia Donovan, Judging Teenagers: How Minors Fare When They Seek CourtAuthorized Abortions, FAM. PLAN. PERSP., Nov.-Dec. 1983, at 259, 260, 266-67. Donovan
quotes from several judges and other officials who administer the procedure; a typical comment, from a public defender, is as follows:
We've gone from 'gee, wouldn't it be a better world if girls were able to talk to
their parents about being pregnant' and taken a quantum leap and ordered them to
talk to their parents or go through a dozen hoops . . . and suffer embarrassment
and inconvenience. I don't think that's brought many families closer together.
Id. at 266.
35. Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 475 (1990) (Marshall, J., concurring in part,
concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part); see also ROBERT H. MNOOKIN,
IN THE INTEREST OF CHILDREN 240 (1985) (suggesting that judges "realize that it would be
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surveys indicate that judges almost never deny permission for an
abortion to a minor judged to be "immature." 36 Often, those judged
to be "immature" obtain abortions in another state.37 If the goal of
the bypass procedure is to prevent "immature" teenagers from having

an abortion when it is not in their best interests, it would seem that
the procedure is a pointless rubber-stamp. a8
However, the procedure is worse than pointless; it is an added

difficulty in the lives of pregnant teenagers. It sometimes presents
very real problems of access: in Minnesota, for example,39 teenagers
must often face a round trip of five hundred miles or more to find an
available judge.' The procedure is bound to add to delay in obtaining the abortion, even if the teenager has access to a court and does
not procrastinate out of anxiety, and delay adds to the medical and
psychological risks of abortion.4' Finally, the discbmfort of the court
appearance itself should not be forgotten. A pregnant teenage girl can
be terrified of an appearance before a judge who has the power to
deny her the right to an abortion.42 No matter how gentle and under-

impossible as a legal proposition to justify a finding that a pregnant minor was too immature,
to decide whether to have an abortion for herself, but that it was in her best interests to
bear the child").
36. See, e.g., Suzanne Yates & Anita J. Pliner, Judging Maturity in the Courts: The
Massachusetts Consent Statute, AM. J. PUB. HEALTH, June 1988, at 646, 647, for an assessment of the Massachusetts parental consent law which replaced the one struck down in
Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979). According to questionnaires filled out by their attorneys, of 477 minors who went through judicial bypass hearings (approximately 23% of the
total who did so between Dee. 1981 and June 1985), only nine were found to be immature.
Only one of these was denied an abortion on the ground that it was not in her best interests,
and she obtained an out-of-state abortion. Id.; see also MNOOKIN, supra note 35, at 239 (reporting that of 1300 pregnant minors who sought judicial bypass under the Massachusetts
statute from Apr. 1981 to Feb. 1983, 90% were found to be mature; five were denied abortions on best interests grounds; four of these later obtained judicial consent and one went out
of state); Hodgson v. Minnesota, 648 F. Supp. 756, 765 (D. Minn. 1986) (citing a fact finding that of 3,573 bypass petitions filed in Minnesota courts, nine were denied).
37. See supra note 36.
38. MNOOKIN, supra note 35, at 240; Melton, Unintended Effects, supra note 29, at 80;
see also Hodgson, 648 F. Supp at 766 (citing testimony by judges who heard over 90% of
the bypass cases under a Minnesota parental notice statute; one referred to the procedure as a
"rubber-stamp"; none believed it had any positive effect on the minors).
39. Minnesota has a statute requiring notification of both parents prior to abortion obtained by unmarried minor which was upheld in Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990)
(upholding MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.343(2) (West 1989)). For a discussion of the statute and
case, see infra notes 98-106 and accompanying text.
40. Donovan, supra note 34, at 259. Many judges in Minnesota, which has a two-parent
notice requirement, refuse to hear abortion petitions for political or moral reasons. Id.
41. Melton & Pliner, supra note 33, at 21.
42. See, e.g., Hodgson, 648 F. Supp at 763. The district court, hearing evidence on the
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standing a judge may be, the message of the entire experience must
be that the teenager is at least suspected of doing something wrong,
or of being a bad, untrustworthy, person. The Court's theory of the
judicial bypass procedure completely ignores the fact that for a pregnant teenager who is already worried, frightened, and possibly
ashamed, an appearance before a judge is not a pro forma exercise.
The sad truth is that a pregnant teenager who is unable to face her
parents or a judge may end up having a child she does not want43

or seeking an illegal abortion at the risk of her life.'
In sum, the judicial bypass procedure at best inconveniences and
at worst endangers pregnant teenagers in the name of protecting them.
Nevertheless, it is perhaps not surprising that the Court has not extended the abortion right to children on the same basis as to adults.
Neglect of children's perspectives by the law, and by society at large,
is more the rule than the exception.45
In addition, it has not been difficult for members of the Court to

fashion a surface rationale that seems to justify the bypass procedure:
the notion of "maturity" as a legitimate legal standard on which to
grant or withhold the right-of adolescents-to choose an abortion.
The assumptions and associations underlying the "maturity" standard
are explored in the following section.

effects of a parental notice statute with bypass, found that the courtroom experience produces
fear and tension and leaves many young women feeling "guilty and ashamed." The court also
found that some minors, 'both "mature" minors and "immature" minors whose best interests
would be served by having an abortion without parental notification, "are so daunted by the
judicial proceeding that they forego the bypass option and either notify their parents or carry
to term." Id.
43. Id.
44. See Hubbard, supra note 33 (telling the story of a 17-year-old who died from complications of an illegal abortion in Massachusetts in 1988; she was afraid to "disappoint" her
parents and was certain a judge would deny her a waiver).
45. See Fitzgerald, supra note 20, at 14-15 ("Our political choices reveal societal hostility to children." For example, the number of children living in poverty increases while the
condition of the elderly has improved; children are denied standing in child custody disputes.); Martha Minow, Rights for the Next Generation: A Feminist Approach to Children's
Rights, 9 HARV. WOMEN'S LJ. 1, 6-7 (1986) (arguing that "the inconsistent legal treatment
of children stems in some measure from societal neglect of children" and pointing out that
over 20% of American children live in poverty, over a million children are reported to authorities as victims of serious abuse, etc.).
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"MATURITY" AS A LEGAL STANDARD FOR DISTRIBUTION OF
RIGHTS

A. Roots of the "Maturity" Standard in the Privacy Right and
Theories of Children's Rights
Privacy right cases and ideology, on which the abortion right is

based,' do not logically suggest broader legal rights for children; in
fact, the reverse is true. And, as this section will show, the "maturity"
standard relied on by the Bellotti bypass procedure derives from both
privacy right ideology and theories of parental and state authority
over children.

The constitutional right of privacy, insofar as it has a definable

content,47 is arguably based on the concept of the autonomous, selfreliant person and the desire to protect autonomy from unwarranted

government regulation of certain life-shaping decisions.48 It has been
renamed the right of personhood,49 and, as Catharine MacKinnon has

pointed out, "[p]ersonhood is a legal and social status, not a biologi-

cal fact."5 One fully attains the status of personhood when one at-

tains the status of autonomy.
The privacy right is essentially about protection of autonomy, but
children, even teenagers, are not fully autonomous in the eyes of the

46. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973).
47. See, e.g., Robert G. Dixon, Jr., The "New" Substantive Due Process and the Demo-

cratic Ethic: A Prolegomenon, 1976 B.Y.U. L. RE'v. 43, 83-87 (arguing that the privacy right
has no intrinsic meaning but is simply a collection of Supreme Court cases protecting individuals from government regulation of certain actions or decisions).
48. See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1308 (2d ed.
1988) (finding that precise definition of the privacy right is impossible, but that the courts
must apply strict scrutiny to "any government action or deliberate omission that appears to
transgress what it means to be human at a given time and place"); Louis Henkin, Privacy
and Autonomy, 74 COLUM. L. REv. 1410, 1411 (1974) (describing the right of privacy as "an
additional zone of autonomy, of presumptive immunity to governmental regulation"); Jed
Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737, 784 (1989) (arguing that "[tihe
principle of the right to privacy is ... the fundamental freedom not to have one's life too
totally determined by a progressively more normalizing state").
49. See TRIBE, supra note 48. For Professor Tribe's attempt to define the privacy right,
see supra note 48.
50. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 YALE L.J
1281, 1316 (1991). MacKinnon discusses the legal and social status of the fetus and finds
that in contemporary society "completed live birth mark[s] the personhood line." Id. I would
suggest that not even live birth ushers a human being into full legal and social personhood.
Children are not yet full persons legally or socially and some people never are: the severely
retarded, for example.
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law or society in general.5 ' Also, many privacy right cases have involved the rights of adults to procreate, to refrain from procreation,
and to raise their children as they see fit. This has led some commentators to place at the "core" of the privacy right the "fundamental
decisions that shape family life,"52 that is, such decisions when made
by adults.53
Given the background of the privacy right in the notions of

individual autonomy and family (parental) autonomy, it is clear that a
privacy right for children is almost an oxymoron. If adults express
their autonomy in part by creating and raising children, it follows that
those children can have little or no autonomy of their own and thus
no claim to a constitutional right of privacy. Seen in this light, the
right of privacy would seem to reinforce what Barbara Bennett
Woodhouse has called the "property model" of the relation between
children and parents.' 4 Woodhouse's property model is not meant to

51. See infra notes 54-62 and accompanying text.
52. Philip B. Heymann & Douglas E. Barzelay, The Forest And The Trees: Roe v.
Wade And Its Critics, 53 B.U. L. REv. 765, 772 (1973).
[IThese cases] clearly delineate a sphere of interests-which the Court now groups
and denominates "privacy"-implicit in the "liberty" protected by the fourteenth
amendment. At the core of this sphere is the right of the individual to make for
himself-except where a very good reason exists for placing the decision in
society's hands-the fundamental decisions that shape family life: whom to marry;
whether and when to have children; and with what values to rear those children.
Id. at 772.
53. The privacy right line of cases is commonly said to begin in the 1920s with two
cases that did not specifically cite a "right of privacy," but which protected parental authority
over education of children from government regulation. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S.
510 (1925) (striking down state requirement that all children attend public school); Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (striking down state laws that forbade foreign language instruction in public schools). Later cases are Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (striking down a statute that required court approval for the marriage of any person legally obligated to pay child support for children not in his or her custody); Moore v. City of East
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (invalidating a local zoning ordinance that restricted those
family members who could live together); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (extending
right of privacy to a woman's decision to abort a pregnancy); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S.
438 (1972) (striking down a law prohibiting use of contraceptives by unmarried couples);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (holding that laws prohibiting the use of
contraceptives violated a constitutional "right of privacy" protecting the marriage relationship);
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (striking down state law prescribing sterilization
for a certain class of criminals); see also Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986) (rejecting a privacy right challenge to a Georgia anti-sodomy statute on the ground that there
was "[n]o connection between family, marriage, or procreation" and "homosexual activity").
54. Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, "Who Owns the Child?": Meyer and Pierce and the
Child as Property, 33 WM. & MARY L. REv. 995, 1042 (1992). Woodhouse's "revisionist
history" of Meyer and Pierce argues that these two cases, cited now as the origins of the
privacy right line of cases and as "expressions of the liberal and libertarian spirit," actually
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claim that children are literally considered to be parental property"
but to assert "that our culture makes assumptions about children deep-

ly analogous to those it adopts in thinking about property."5 To the
extent this is true, it obviously conflicts with any claim of a child to

a right of privacy: one cannot "belong to oneself' if one belongs to
another."
An alternate model of parental authority, which Katharine T.

Bartlett has called "the exchange view of parenthood,"58 relies not
on rights of ownership but on fulfillment of responsibilities. According to this model, parental authority over children derives from
society's need to delegate the task of child-rearing to those best-situated and best-motivated to do it well-almost always the parents.59
can be seen as constitutionalizing a "narrow, tradition-bound vision of the child as essentially
private property." Id. at 996-97. Both cases defeated attempts to exert state as opposed to
parental control over the education of children.
55. Of course, in ancient Rome children were literally the property of their father and a
strong presumption of paternal rights in children existed in 19th century American law. In
more recent times, this has been replaced by a gender-neutral presumption of parental rights.
Id. at 1043-46.
56. Id. at 1042. Woodhouse further explains that she:
do[es] not claim that [the property model of parenthood] represents the whole of a
parent's relationship to his or her child but rather that it is useful in clarifying the
historic responses of parents and judges to legislative and court interventions in the
family. . . . Mhis property rhetoric sheds important light not only on Meyer and
Pierce, but on many ways in which courts and authorities act inconsistently with a
trusteeship or best interest theory of adult power over children. If we look at history and listen to legislators, judges, and parents speaking about parental rights,
clearly children were, and are, often conceptualized as closely akin to property.
Id. at 1042-43; see also Janet Farrell Smith, Parenting and Property, in MOTHERING 199-212
(Joyce Trebilcot ed., 1983) (describing the "implicit model of property relations [that] underlies certain views about parenting").
57. See Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S.
747, 777 n.5 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting Charles Fried, Correspondence, 6 PHIL.
& PUB. Arr. 288-89 (1977): the privacy right "embodies the 'moral fact that a person belongs to himself and not others nor to society as a whole').
58. Katharine T. Bartlett, Re-Expressing Parenthood, 98 YALE LJ. 293, 297-98 (1988)
(explaining that the concept of parenthood as an exchange of rights and duties emerged with
the development of the "modem liberal state").
59. See, e.g., Parham v. J.L. 442 U.S. 584, 604 (1979) (citing "the traditional presumption that the parents act in the best interests of their child" to reject a due process challenge
to a state procedure allowing parents to commit their child to a mental institution without an
adversary hearing). Other examples are the many cases and statutes that give preference to a
biological parent in child custody disputes with third parties, often without even theoretical
attention to the best interests of the child. See IRA M. ELLMAN Er AL., FAMILY LAW 600
(1991) (stating the "traditional role . . . that a parent prevails against a non-parent" in the
absence of special circumstances and listing representative cases); see also infra note 103,
(discussing Justice Anthony Kennedy's view that children have rights only "through and with"
their parents, expressed in Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 481 (1990) (Kennedy, J.,
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The parents are the most likely to be able to raise their child into a
productive, well-behaved adult citizen. According to this view, paren-

tal authority stems not from ownership of the child, but from the
child's immaturity and, therefore, her need for such adult guidance
until she reaches adulthood,' and society's need to delegate the task
of child-raising to those most likely to perform it well.
The "exchange" model of parental authority is invoked by the
courts when they wish to limit parental authority-since such authority originates in the state, the state can limit it if the parents fail to

use it wisely." However, a corollary of this view would seem to be
that if a particular child is in fact "mature" enough to make her own

decisions, then both parental and state authority over her should
cease. In other words, the common rationale for withholding full legal
rights from children is that they must be protected from their innate
"immaturity."'62 Yet it is widely recognized that the assumption that
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part)).
60. Bruce C. Hafen has pointed out that due to the strength of the presumption that
minors are immature and need to be protected,
the growth of democratic ideals in American society, rather than encouraging the
"liberation" of children from limitations upon their liberty, has encouraged even
greater discrimination on the basis of age-to protect children from the excesses of
their immature faculties and to promote the development of their ability ultimately
to assume responsibility.
Bruce C. Hafen, Children's Liberation and the New Egalitarianism:Some Reservations About
Abandoning Youth to Their "Rights," 1976 B.Y.U. L. REv. 605, 613.
61. See, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (The Prince court upheld the application of a child labor statute to an aunt/guardian who allowed her niece to sell
religious pamphlets on a public street; the Court pointed out the source and limitations of parental authority: "It is cardinal with us that the custody, care, and nurture of the child reside
first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations
the state can neither supply nor hinder . . . . [It is in recognition of this that these decisions have respected the private realm of family life.") (citation omitted) (emphasis added);
see also infra notes 63-76 (discussing Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (Powell, J.,
plurality opinion)).
62. Children, even older adolescents, are routinely not given full legal rights, generally
with the rationale that people under a certain age must be protected from the consequences
of their emotional, physical and intellectual immaturity. See supra note 60; see also Planned
Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 102 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
The State's interest in the welfare of its young citizens justifies a variety of protective measures. Because he may not foresee the consequences of his decision, a
minor may not make an enforceable bargain. He may not lawfully work or travel
where he pleases, or even attend exhibitions of constitutionally protected adult
motion pictures. Persons below a certain age may not marry without parental consent. . . .The State's interest in protecting a young person from harm justifies the
imposition of restraints on his or her freedom even though comparable restraints on
adults would be constitutionally impermissible.
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children are "immature" while adults are "mature" is a generalization,
and that one can find some minors who are more "mature" in some
respects than some adults. Therefore, if it is true that children's rights

are limited because of a personal quality-"immaturity"-rather than
merely physical age and thus their legal status as children-then it
follows that children who can show they are not "immature" arguably
have a claim to be free of both parental and state authority. This

claim would be particularly strong for certain important life-shaping
decisions, such as those protected by the privacy right cases. As
explained in the next section, this is the rationale of the judicial bypass procedure, at least as originally set out by Justice Lewis Powell.
B. The Bellotti Bypass Procedure

As stated in the introduction, Justice Powell's plurality opinion in
Bellotti v. Baird,' in addition to rejecting a Massachusetts parental
consent statute as unconstitutional,' proposed guidelines for a bypass
procedure" that would make a parental consent statute acceptable to
the Court.

Powell carefully laid a foundation for the constitutionality of this
procedure. He first justified parental authority on the basis of the

vulnerability and dependence of children;'

he then tempered that

authority by invoking a version of the "exchange" view67 of parental

Id. But see Fitzgerald, supra note 20, at 13. Fitzgerald points out the nonsensical situations
often created by the presumption that children are "immature" while adults are not. The
"millionaire's child" may void a fair contract while an adult is stuck with a "barely
conscionable deal"; teenagers cannot work in the "safest of manufacturing jobs" while many
adult workers are faced with dangerous working conditions, etc.
63. 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
64. Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 644-51 (Powell, J., plurality opinion) (explaining how the rejected statute fell short of the guidelines set out for a bypais procedure).
65.
A pregnant minor is entitled in such a proceeding to show either: (1) that she is
mature enough and well enough informed to make her abortion decision, in consultation with her physician, independently of her parents' wishes; or (2) that even if
she is not able to make this decision independently, the desired abortion would be
in her best interests.
Id. at 643-44. The procedure would also have to "be completed with anonymity and sufficient expedition to provide an effective opportunity" for the minor to obtain an abortion. Id.
66. According to Powell, children's rights are limited in comparison to adults' rights for
three reasons: children are vulnerable; they lack the knowledge and maturity needed to make
critical decisions; the parental role in raising and guiding children is very important. Id. at
633-34.
67. See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text (defining the "exchange view" of
parental authority).
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rights. He listed two justifications for the dominant role the state
allows parents in raising children: first, state-mandated parental involvement in the important decisions of children protects children
from the state itself and from their own immaturity;' second, and
more important, parents have the role of preparing children for citizenship.69 Parental authority over children is not only consistent with
the ideal of individual liberty, it is necessary to it. "Legal restrictions
on minors, especially those supportive of the parental role, may be
important to the child's chances for the full growth and maturity that
make eventual participation in a free society meaningful and rewarding."7 Finally, Powell insisted that in this case the "need to preserve
the constitutional right and the unique nature of the abortion decision . . . require a State to act with particular sensitivity when it
legislates to foster parental involvement" in a minor's abortion decision.7 1 The state cannot require that all teenagers receive parental
consent before obtaining an abortion; it must allow "mature" teenagers to obtain an abortion without parental consent or knowledge, and
it must allow "immature" teenagers to do so if it is in their "best
interests."72
The Bellotti bypass procedure is based on the principle that when
a minor arrives at "full growth and maturity," the state will no longer
enforce parental authority over him or her, nor will it exercise state
authority in place of an inadequate parent. Powell acknowledges that
the point of "full growth and maturity" is generally set at the age of
majority.73 However, in this case, the "unique nature"'74 of the abortion decision requires that common presumptions about maturity of
children and the authority of parents be set aside and replaced with

68. Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 637 (Powell, J., plurality opinion).
69. Id. at 637-38
70. Id. at 638-39.
71. Id. at 642. Two factors make this a decision for which blanket parental consent cannot be required: the need to make the decision as quickly as possible and the "grave and
indelible" consequences of denying the minor the right to an abortion. Id. at 642-43.
72. Id. at 643-44. The "best interests" standard in effect replaces the "good cause" standard included in the rejected statute. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. These terms
may well amount to the same thing in this context, but "best interests," familiar of course
from child custody law, is probably meant to emphasize that the proceeding is premised on
the welfare of the teenager.
73. Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 643 n.23 (Powell, J., plurality opinion) (explaining that the
state may generally use the age of majority as a prerequisite for full legal rights, even
though it is "inevitably arbitrary," because of the state's interest in supporting parental authority and because definition and determination of "maturity" raises problems).
74. See supra note 71.
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case-by-case determinations of "maturity" and best interests.
Thus, Powell's rationale places the bypass procedure firmly in
the tradition of state deference to parental authority, but acknowledges
the importance of the abortion decision by limiting that authority in
terms that are suggested by the "exchange theory" of parental
rights.75 The "mature" child is therefore to be exempt from both
state and parental interference in her abortion decision. However, as
shown in part II, the "mature" child is not exempt from state authority because the state may still require her to go through the bypass
procedure itself.76 Yet the Court ignores the actual effects of the bypass procedure on pregnant teenagers, while state legislators and the
voters they represent continue to find it acceptable law.
The next section explores the assumptions and connotations of
the "maturity" concept in an attempt to understand how it can succeed as a legal standard in spite of its failure to achieve its stated
goals of liberating and protecting pregnant minors.
C. The Fallacy of "Maturity/Immaturity" as a Legal Standard
The Bellotti bypass procedure has a superficial legitimacy because it appears to challenge the presumption that "maturity"-in this
context, the ability to make an important decision wisely-comes
with, and only with, the age of majority. After all, no one really
believes that all persons are "immature" in some definable way until
the day they reach eighteen, at which time they magically become
"mature." It is a social and legal convention to describe people in this
way.
However, even while we know on some level that this is a simplistic generalization, it does have the power to shape the way we
think about people and behave toward them. We place people in
predefined categories and perceive them in a certain way based on
the category in which they are placed.77 We expect adults to be ma-

75. For a discussion of the exchange theory see supra notes 58-60 and accompanying
text.
76. See supra notes 23-45 and accompanying text.
77. Joseph Goldstein has defined the categories "child," "adult," and "parent" as follows:
To be a child is to be at risk, dependent, and without capacity or authority
to decide what is "best" for oneself.
To be an adult is to be a risktaker, independent, and with capacity and authority to decide and to do what is "best" for oneself.
To be an adult who is a parent is to be presumed in law to have the
capacity, authority, and responsibility to determine and to do what is good for

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol23/iss2/4

16

Veith: The Judicial Bypass Procedure and Adolescents' Abortion Rights: T
FALLACY OF THE "MATURITY" STANDARD

ture and adolescents to be immature and our expectations influence
the behavior of the adults and adolescents we meet.78
The power of the convention that people become capable of
taking care of and being responsible for themselves at a designated
age derives in part from another convention of great power: the cultural ideal of the autonomous, self-reliant individual, discussed earlier
in connection with the right of privacy.79 Our culture's investment in
the concept of individual autonomy is not a literal belief that all
adults are equally capable of making wise decisions and carrying
them out in the world. This too is a convention, a presumption on
which we base our legal rules.'0 Yet, precisely because we know
that complete autonomy is not attainable in the real world, the concept of the autonomous person calls into being and relies on the
opposite concept: the dependent, subordinate person. If some identifiable group of persons is presumed to be autonomous, then another
identifiable group must be presumed to be dependent, because it is
only in opposition to the concept "dependence" that the concept "autonomy" has meaning.
The judicial bypass procedure, while it rejects the assumption
that all pregnant adults can be trusted to make a "good" decision to
have an abortion and all pregnant minors cannot, relies on the "maturity" concept to divide all minors into two categories: those who can
be trusted to make a "good" abortion decision because they are "mature" and those who cannot because they are "immature." This new
classification actually perpetuates the idea that people can be divided
into two groups, one autonomous and one dependent, based not on
age alone, but on age, or, if it comes first, the attainment of "maturity." In short, the bypass procedure sets aside one simplistic categorization of society8 into autonomous and nonautonomous individuals
one's children.
Joseph Goldstein, Medical Care for the Child at Risk: On State Supervention of Parental
Autonomy, 86 YALE L.J. 645, 645 (1977).
78. As mentioned above, some experts believe that much of the difference between the
decision-making performance observed between adults and adolescents results from different
social roles and expectations. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
79. See supra notes 46-53 and accompanying text.
80. It is a presumption that perhaps reflects a commitment to the idea that in a moral
sense all autonomous persons are equal and therefore the law should treat them as equals.
81. Martha Minow has pointed out that classification, the creation of boundaries, is an
essential element of legal analysis. MARTHA MrNow, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION AND AMERICAN LAW 7-11 (1990).
Law has treated as marginal, inferior, and different any person who does not fit
the normal model of the autonomous, competent individual. Law has tended to
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only to replace it with another.8 2
The flaw in the reliance of the bypass procedure on "maturity" is

not that "maturity" is an illusion or an inherently simplistic concept.
Clearly "maturity" does mean something that most people could agree
upon, at least in general terms. Most people do "mature" throughout
their lives; they learn about themselves, they learn to consider longterm consequences of their actions, they learn to consider others, they
gain useful knowledge and experience. The problem is that the bypass
procedure operates as if this rather amorphous concept8 3 were a uniform quality that one either has or does not have and that its presence in a given (minor) person can be easily identified by an objective (adult) observer.

To put it another way, the Court's call for a case-by-case determination of "maturity" evokes a humane, reasoned consideration of
the capacity of young people to handle a difficult situation on their
own. There is something appealing and reassuring in the thought that
at least some adult will talk to a young person before she commits

the irrevocable act of abortion. But it is as if the reality of the bypass
procedure-the way it actually affects young people's lives-is disguised by this evocation of benevolent adult authority. This disguising
effect is helped along by the Court's assumption that "maturity" is a

uniform, easily recognizable quality, an assumption which is in turn
supported by the close association of "maturity" with the age of majority4--the very association that the bypass procedure is supposedly

deny the mutual dependence of all people while accepting and accentuating the dependency of people who are "different." And law has relied on abstract concepts,
presented as if they have clear and known boundaries, even though the concepts
await redefinition with each use.
Id. at 10.
82. Of course by allowing an inquiry into the "maturity" only of minor women, the
bypass procedure continues to distribute rights based on the attainment of the age of majority. In other words, once one is over eighteen one has the right to decide to get an abortion
without undergoing an inquiry into one's "maturity."
83. See, e.g., the rather circular definitions of "mature" in RANDOM HOUSE UNABRIDGED
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (2d ed. 1983):
1. complete in natural growth or development, as plant and animal forms. . . . 2.
ripe, as fruit, or fully aged, as cheese or wine. 3. fully developed in body or
mind, as a person, a mature woman.
Id. at 1187.
84. In other words, we are used to thinking of people as independent or dependent,
capable of caring for themselves or incapable of it, based on physical age. Social expectations and legal rules rely on this assumption, so that attaining the age of majority has tremendous significance in a person's life. It would be natural to assume, even if on an unconscious level, that if society grants a person a new, adult status at a certain age, there must
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designed to challenge. In other words, it is easier for "maturity,"
though undefined, to become accepted as a legal standard in this
context, because it appeals to our instinctive desire to believe in the
benevolent exercise of adult authority, even while it claims to reject
the arbitrary exercise of that authority. Because "maturity" appeals to
our belief that there is some quantifiable difference between the capacity of adults and of children, it is easier to get away with offering
"maturity" as an undefined standard. In fact, despite Justice Powell's
insistence on the "unique nature" of the abortion decision,85 the bypass procedure's reliance on an undefined "maturity" implies that the
decision to abort a pregnancy is in a class with other decisions like
renting an apartment or selecting a college-decisions in which a
certain kind of experience or judgment is clearly desirable. Yet the
decision to end one's pregnancy--or to have a child for that matter,
though no "maturity" test is required for this-is arguably unlike
many other decisions. It is an extraordinarily intimate, personal decision, essentially because the pregnancy and the abortion take place
within the pregnant woman's own body. It is not unreasonable to ask
what kind of "maturity" one needs to decide whether or not to carry
a pregnancy to term or have an abortion.
To clarify this point, suppose that the bypass procedure had
relied on "competence" rather than "maturity." Competence is after all
a familiar legal standard; courts are required to determine the competence of individuals in various situations, such as standing trial, refusing medical treatment, signing a will, etc., though of course the rule
is that adults are presumed competent barring evidence to the contrary. 6 However, legal standards for competency in these situations
are different, because it is realized that competence means something
different in each context. 7 Thus, in the abortion context, the Court
might have required that state legislatures that do not want to presume that all teenagers are competent to decide to have an abortion
must develop a standard of competency which is related to the abor-

be a reason for it-something must be happening to them at around this stage in their lives
that warrants a change in their status. When one labels this change "maturity," it follows that
the possession of "maturity" must be somehow visible, like the physical signs of aging. This
chain of "reasoning" occurs on a less than conscious level; it is therefore difficult to prove
and yet very powerful.
85. See supra note 71.
86. See Kevin R. Wolff, Note, Determining Patient Competency in Treatment Refusal
Cases, 24 GA. L. REv. 733, 743 (1990).
87. Id.
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tion decision itself.8 If the teenager could not pass this competency
test, she could still receive court or parental authorization to have an

abortion. This Note does not argue that such a rule is desirable, but
rather that it would have greater legitimacy than the "maturity" stan-

dard because it would at least require state legislatures to give some
consideration of what capacity a teenager must have to be allowed to
decide to obtain an abortion. 9
It is notable that surveys of decisions made by judges who ad-

minister the bypass procedure indicate that, in the vast majority of
cases, pregnant teenagers are deemed to be "mature" enough to make
an abortion decision themselves.' There is of course no way of
knowing what-standards of "maturity" these judges are applying, but
the overwhelming numbers of "mature" minors suggests that, whatev-

er those standards are, judges have concluded in their own minds that
as a rule those teenagers that appear before them have whatever it
takes to make that decision. As argued above in part II, this result,

combined with the fact that those few teenagers who are found "immature" are almost invariably granted permission to receive an abortion because it is found to be in their best interests, points to the
futility of the bypass procedure itself.9 In addition, the "maturity"

88. For example, tests to determine capacity to refuse life-saving medical treatment
include the ability to "evidence a choice," the "reasonable outcome" test, the "rational reasons" test, the "ability to understand" test, and the "actual understanding" test; the names of
these tests are all fairly self explanatory. Id. at 744-49.
89. Of course, states are now free to set up guidelines defining what is meant by "maturity." The parental consent statutes of both Missouri and Kentucky, for example, provide for
bypass procedures which require the court to "hear evidence relating to the emotional development, maturity, intellect and understanding of the minor." Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 311.732(3)(e) (Michie. Supp. 1994); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.028.2(2)(3) (Vernon 1983).
This is so broad as to arguably not be of much use; see also N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.103.1(2)(a) (1991) (requiring the court to determine whether the teenager is "sufficiently mature
and well informed with regard to the nature, effects, and possible consequences of both having an abortion and bearing her child to be able to choose intelligently among the alternatives"); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112 § 12S (West 1983) (requiring judge to determine
whether the minor "is mature and capable of giving informed consent to the proposed abortion"). Parental notice statutes tend to provide less detailed guidance to courts faced with
administering bypass procedures: typical are the requirements that the judge determine "that
the pregnant woman is mature and capable of giving informed consent," MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 144.343.Subd.6(c)(i) (West 1989), or that the teenager show she is "sufficiently mature and
well enough informed to decide intelligently whether to have an abortion." OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2151.85(C)(1) (Anderson 1994); see also ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-16-804 (Michie
1991).
90. See supra note 36 (giving results of three surveys that show that the overwhelming
majority of pregnant teenagers are judged to be "mature").
91. See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
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standard does leave the door open for inconsistent and idiosyncratic
decisions by judges. 2 Therefore, though the bypass procedure unfairly gains legitimacy from the connotations of the "maturity" standard,
the real damage done by the bypass procedure is not caused by judicial misuse of this concept. The real damage is caused simply by the
existence of the requirement of the court appearance itself. As cited
above in part II, the necessity of appearing in court sometimes presents logistical difficulties which increase delay.93 In addition, appre-

hension of the appearance can increase delay, and the appearance
itself can produce anxiety, shame, and guilt. 4 Yet the procedure itself is believed by those who administer it to bring nothing of value

to minors or their families.95
In supporting the bypass procedure, the Court ignores these results. It further ignores the fact that the process of identifying "maturity" must itself constitute government intrusion into an individual's

privacy.96 This intrusion is of course inevitable once the burden of
proving "maturity" and hence "autonomy" has been shifted to the

individual on a case-by-case basis, rather than being a presumption
based on some physical or social characteristic such as age, race, sex,
or class. By separating "maturity" from the presumption that it occurs
at a pre-defined age, the Court removes the protection that this presumption affords-protection from government intrusion into personal
decisions and our capacity to make them.
It is significant that this intrusion is permitted only when its

subject is a minor. If the Court's concern were truly whether or not a

92. See, e.g., Steven F. Stuhlbarg, Casenote, When is a Pregnant Minor Mature? When
is an Abortion in her Best Interests? The Ohio Supreme Court Applies Ohio's Abortion Parental Notification Law: In re Jane Doe 1, 566 N.E.2d 1181 (Ohio 1991), 60 CINCINNATi L.
REv. 907 (1992). Stuhlbarg tells the story of "Jane Doe," a young Ohio woman who was
denied judicial bypass of a parental notice requirement because she had not proved her maturity or that an abortion would be in her best interests; Ohio's statute requires clear and convincing evidence of both of these claims. See infra note 112. Jane was seventeen, held parttime jobs and helped support herself, and had had one abortion in the past. She consulted
with her mother but was af-aid to tell her father who had beaten her in the past. Id. at 90708. For a detailed discussion of the Ohio statute in question and the Supreme Court case
upholding it, see infra notes 107-12.
93. See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
94. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
95. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
96. Though Justice Powell acknowledged the difficulty of defining and determining "maturity," Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 643 n.23 (1979) (Powell, J. plurality opinion), no
attempt was made in this decision or any later decision to suggest how states might deal
with this difficulty.
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pregnant woman had the "maturity" to decide to have an abortion, it
would have to permit states to require others-fathers, husbands,
doctors, judges-to review the decision of adult women as well. To
the extent that "maturity" is a definable concept, there is of course no
guarantee that the age of majority brings "maturity" with it, just as
there is no guarantee that a person under the age of majority is "immature." However, one can imagine the outrage that would result
from a serious suggestion that this should be the law. The power of
adult women in contemporary politics and society, and common perceptions of their "maturity" and autonomy, would probably not permit
such a rule. Children lack this power and hence are vulnerable to
manipulation by adults: this is really what the bypass procedure is all
about.
IV. THE TRUE FUNCTION OF THE JUDICIAL BYPASS PROCEDURE

The judicial bypass procedure has succeeded in becoming the
current state of the law. It has failed, however, in its stated objectives
to liberate "mature" and protect "immature" pregnant teenagers. The
irony is that children are vulnerable and in need of protection, quite
often because of adults. The judicial bypass procedure not only fails
to give them protection, it is itself an example of the victimization of
children.
The real point of the bypass procedure is the exercise of adult
control of children, and particularly adult manipulation of childrenmade possible by children's political and legal vulnerability-to make
political points: in this case, to take the brunt of political efforts to
block abortion rights. Thus, since the Bellotti bypass procedure was
presented in 1979, versions of it have been used by later legislatures
and later Court decisions to validate oppressive statutes that fail even
to live up to the "particular sensitivity" for which the Bellotti plurality opinion called.'
In the two most recent major cases dealing with minors' abortion
rights," the Court upheld state laws restricting the abortion right of
minors. Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc." and

Hodgson v. Minnesota"° both approved oppressive legislation essen97. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
98. For a list of the most significant minor's abortion rights cases, see supra notes 1112.
99. 497 U.S. 502 (1990).
100. 497 U.S. 417 (1990).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol23/iss2/4

22

Veith: The Judicial Bypass Procedure and Adolescents' Abortion Rights: T
19941

FALLACY OF THE "MATURITY" STANDARD

tially because it contained versions of the Bellotti bypass option."'
In Hodgson, the Court considered the constitutionality of alternate provisions of a parental notice statute: it rejected one that required notice to both parents with no provision for judicial bypass,
but it upheld the same requirement with a judicial bypass option."
The swing voter was Justice O'Connor, the only justice to find that

the bypass option made constitutional an-in her opinion-otherwise
unconstitutional statute. 03

101. The Court first upheld a parental consent measure with judicial bypass in Planned
Parenthood v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 492-93 (1983). Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.028 closely resembled the Bellotti model statute: it required that a physician obtain written informed consent from the minor and one parent or guardian unless the minor had a court order granting
the right of "self-consent"; the court was to hear evidence of the "emotional development,
maturity, intellect, and understanding of the minor, the nature, possible consequences, and
alternatives to the abortion," id. § 188.028.2(3); or evidence that the abortion was in the
minor's best interests. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. at 493. Nevertheless, Justices Blackmun, Marshall,
Brennan, and Stevens dissented on the ground that it violated the Danforth rule against a
third-party veto of a pregnant teenager's decision. Id. at 503-04 (Blackmun, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
102. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.343(2)-(5) (West 1989). The provision with bypass was
meant to go into effect if the other was blocked by the courts, which is in fact what happened. Hodgson v. Minnesota, 648 F. Supp. 756, 781 (D. Minn. 1986).
103. Hodgson, 497 U.S. at 461 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment). Justices Stevens, Marshall, Brennan, and Blackmun believed the notice requirement
to be unconstitutional with or without judicial bypass. Id. at 455, 461 (Marshall, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part). Justices Kennedy,
Scalia, Rehnquist, and White believed it to be constitutional with or without bypass. Id. at
481 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). Justice
Kennedy's opinion, joined by the other three, demonstrates how distant his position is from
Justice Powell's Bellotti opinion. As Justice Kennedy put it, the rights of children are clearly
subordinated to those of parents: children are denied many rights, and they can "exercise the
rights they do have only through and with parental consent." Id. at 482. Thus Justice
Kennedy's view is clearly closer to the "property model" of children's rights than the "exchange view" of Justice Powell's opinion. Justice Powell stated two justifications for state
support of parental authority and by implication, for a constitutional limit to state support of
parental authority: the parents' duty to socialize the child and the need to protect the child
from the authority of the state. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 637 (1979) (Powell, J., plurality opinion). Justice Kennedy, however, acknowledged no constitutional protection for the
child but only for the parent's "liberty interest" in the child, Hodgson, 497 U.S. at 484
(Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part), and thus would
allow the state to pass legislation to "foster parental participation" in the child's life. Id. at
484-85. The result of this reasoning is to leave the child without protection from either parental or state authority. The state may intrude into the child's life if it does so in the name
of fostering parental authority, or the parent's right to a relationship with the child. See Homer H. Clark, Jr., Children and the Constitution, 1992 U. ILL. L. REv. 1, 36 (commenting
that if Justice Kennedy's Hodgson opinion that a child's claim must be asserted by her parents becomes the "position of a majority of the Justices, America's children are indeed in
trouble").
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The federal district court had held, 4 on the basis of lengthy
testimony on the effects of the two-parent notice requirement with
bypass, that such a requirement placed an unacceptable burden on
pregnant minors and their families. °5 Nevertheless, Justice
O'Connor, though she believed that two-parent notice without bypass
was unconstitutional, decided that the bypass option saved the stat06
ute.1
The majority in Akron Center held a parental consent statute
constitutional on the ground that its judicial bypass procedure complied with the guidelines set out in Powell's Bellotti opinion. 7 The
bypass procedure included such apparently pointless difficulties as
making the minor select one of three complaint forms prior to her
court appearance; one states that she is mature enough to choose an
abortion, another that a parent has regularly abused her, another that
an abortion is in her best interests. 1 8
Justice Blackmun's dissent"° correctly pointed out that Ohio's
statute may be in conformance with a technical interpretation of the
Bellotti guidelines, but it is not in conformance with the reasoning of
Bellotti which formed the basis for the guidelines. Ohio's legislature,

104. Hodgson v. Minnesota, 648 F. Supp. 756 (D.Minn. 1986).
105. Id. at 777-79. The court found that the effect had been to involve possibly disruptive, violent, or indifferent parents in the minor's decision, even if the minor had already
confided in one parent and neither she nor that parent wanted the other parent to know. Id.
at 777-78. The court found that the bypass procedure, was a "traumatic distraction" that
interfered with the existing parent-child bond. Id. at 778. The court also found that the difficulty of scheduling a hearing typically caused delays of two or three days and up to a week,
thus adding to the health risks to the minor. Id. at 779; see supra note 42 (citing the district
court's finding of emotional stress experienced by minors faced with the bypass procedure).
106. Hodgson, 497 U.S. at 461 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment) (holding that interference with the family "simply does not exist" where there is a
bypass option).
107. Ohio v. Akron Center for Reprod. Health, Inc., 497 U.S. 502, 518-20 (1990): see
also OHto REv. CODE ANN. §§ 2919.12, 2151.85, 2505.073 (Anderson 1994). These statutes
make it a crime for a physician to perform an abortion on an unmarried, unemancipated
minor unless 1) the physician provides twenty-four hour notice to one parent or guardian, or
to an adult relative of the minor if the minor and the adult sign an affidavit stating that the
minor fears physical, sexual, or severe emotional abuse from one of her parents, or 2) the
physician has written consent from one parent or guardian, or 3) a juvenile court issues an
order permitting the abortion (the bypass option), or 4) the court gives constructive authorization for the abortion by failing to act expeditiously.
108. OHio REv. CODE ANN. §§ 2919.12, 2151.85, 2505.073. The court must appoint a
lawyer and guardian ad litem (after the minor has selected the pleading form), and the minor
must prove all allegations by clear and convincing evidence. Akron Center, 497 U.S. at 51820.
109. Joined by Justices Marshall and Brennan. Id. at 516.
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rather than acting with the "particular sensitivity" called for by
Bellotti, had acted with "particular insensitivity" and had created "a
tortuous maze" through which the pregnant teenager must find her
way."'
Justice Kennedy's Akron Center decision centered on the
Bellotti bypass procedure,"' ignoring the reasoning that accompanied
and explained it. Each provision of the procedure was considered
separately and found not to be expressly ruled out by Bellotti."2
Based on Akron and Hodgson, the bypass option is not only a
rubber stamp procedure in itself, but it has become a rubber stamp by

which states "constitutionalize" statutes which function only as burdens on pregnant teenagers who seek an abortion.113 The actual
function, then, of the judicial bypass procedure is to allow state legislators to use pregnant teenagers in the political struggle against abortion rights.

110. Id. at 525 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Further, the state had not shown any "significant state interest in deliberately placing its pattern of obstacles in the path of the pregnant
minor . . . . The challenged provisions . . . are merely 'poorly disguised elements of discouragement for the abortion decision."' Id. at 525-26 (quoting Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 763 (1986)). The Court, Justice
Blackmun wrote, "considers each provision in a piecemeal fashion, never acknowledging or
assessing" the burden that the procedure as a whole places on the minor. Id. at 527.
111. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 651-52 (1979) (Powell, J., plurality opinion).
112. Akron Center, 497 U.S. at 514-17. The Court upheld the constructive authorization
provision, rejecting a claim that the lack of an affirmative order from the court giving permission for the abortion after it had failed to act within the set time limit would deter physicians from performing the operation. Id. at 515. The Court upheld the clear and convincing
evidence standard of proof as applied to the minor attempting to prove her maturity, a pattern of parental abuse, or best interests, since Bellotti had allowed a state to place the burden
of proof on the minor to show her maturity or best interests, and a higher standard of proof
is appropriate in an ex parte proceeding. Id. at 515-16. The Court held that forcing the minor to choose one of three pleading forms when petitioning the court would not interfere
with her Bellotti right to show maturity or best interests. Bearing in mind that at this point
no lawyer or guardian ad litem would have been appointed, the Court reasoned that it was
"unlikely that the Ohio courts will treat a minor's choice of complaint form without due care
and understanding for her unrepresented status." Id. at 517.
113. See Hubbard, supra note 33, at 243 (finding that Hodgson means the Court will
approve a law that severely abridges the minor's rights if it contains a bypass option, and
that under the Ohio statute minors are "completely at the mercy" of the judge's personal
view of abortion); Melody G. Embree & Tracy A. Dobson, Parental Involvement in Adolescent Abortion Decisions: A Legal and Psychological Critique, 10 LAW & INEQ. J. 53, 78
(1991) (arguing that "parental involvement legislation can be viewed as part of an ongoing
effort to ban all abortions"); Clyde Moore, Note, Hodgson v. Minnesota: The Fog Clears
from Parental Notice Laws, 16 T. MARSHALL L. REv. 399, 416-18 (1991) (arguing that the
Court's approval of two-parent notice with bypass ignores the fact that many teenagers live
in one-parent homes and that the choice of going to court or giving parental notice may lead
young women to seek illegal abortions).
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V. A MoRE JUST ALTERNATIVE
It would seem to be a matter of simple justice to extend to
pregnant teenagers a privacy right to choose abortion on the same

basis as adults. As this Note has tried to show, the judicial bypass
procedure is based on questionable assumptions about the capacity of
young women to make an abortion decision;" 4 it is pointless because the overwhelming majority of teenagers who appear in court
end up receiving authorization to obtain an abortion;. 5 and the procedure itself represents an inconvenient and potentially dangerous bur-

den. 16 As long as Roe v. Wade"' remains the law of the land,"'

its protection should apply to all women who are pregnant
and who
9
pregnancy.1
of
burdens
and
dangers
the
face
therefore

This approach would condition the abortion right on the state of
pregnancy itself rather than age or "maturity." Joseph Goldstein has
suggested that "[p]regnancy alone, without regard to a child's age,
would be a sufficiently objective standard for emancipation to deter-

114. See supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text. Admittedly, the evidence on the decision-making competence of adolescents is inconclusive. See supra note 25. However, it could
be argued that the paucity of such information despite the routine denial of rights to adolescents based supposedly on their inability to make important decisions is in itself an indication
of the unwillingness of society to be genuinely concerned with the rights and needs of young
people. Further, the fact that the Court has ignored what little evidence exists on the subject
is arguably evidence of the same thing.
115. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
116. See supra notes 39-44 and accompanying text.
117. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
118. Roe held that a woman's right to choose abortion would be protected from government interference within certain constraints. The Court found two state interests sufficiently
compelling to limit the pregnant woman's right: the health of the mother and the life of the
fetus. Id. at 162. The Court then went on to construct a trimester framework which allotted
various strengths to competing interests based on the progression of the fetus to viability. The
state's interest in protecting the mother's health becomes compelling only after the first trimester, the state's interest in protecting the potential life of the fetus becomes compelling
only after viability, which is roughly after the second trimester. Thus, no regulation is permitted during the first trimester, regulation only to protect the mother's health is permitted during the second trimester, and abortion may be prohibited during the third trimester. Id. at
162-64.
119. The Court's decision in Roe was of course based explicitly on the privacy right
protection of the right to procreate or refrain from procreation, but the Court went on to
emphasize the "detriment" the state would impose on a woman by denying her an abortion:
the physical and mental burdens of pregnancy and child care, the pain of an unwanted child,
the strain on a family unable to care for the child, and the "stigma of unwed motherhood."
Id. at 153. All of these burdens of course fall at least as hard on a teenage mother as on an
adult mother.
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mine whether or not to obtain an abortion."'"0 Laura Purdy, in a
book which questions the approach of "child liberationists,'' states
that "[a]ccess to abortion without parental consent . . is fully appropriate."'" Pointing out that abortion rights laws have been in part

motivated by "the general recognition that parenthood is a serious
responsibility" and the "concern of women, in particular, to have
more control over their own bodies and lives," Purdy argues that the
"burden of proof should be on opponents of such access to show why
the same arguments don't justify these similar rights for girls."'"

The even-handed application of the privacy right in the context
of the abortion choice would be a genuine improvement in the law. It
would not, however, be the ideal solution, for reasons that have to do
with the nature of the privacy right itself. The privacy right is based
on the stated cultural ideal that all persons who are really persons,
and who therefore have full legal rights, are autonomous, self-reliant,
self-contained individuals. 24 This ideology encourages the legal system to ignore the obvious and real power imbalances between people
that prevent many from having real control over their lives."l s Thus,
the power imbalance between men and women that results in unwanted pregnancy is frozen in place by laws that allot to women a "right"

to an abortion without changing the circumstances of their lives."
Meanwhile, the debate over abortion rights centers on the right to
"choose," in an abstract sense, what one may not be able to get any-

120. Goldstein, supra note 77, at 663:
The right to . . . emancipation [for purposes of a given health-care choice] should
not rest on satisfying, on a case-by-case basis, some body of wise persons that the
particular child is "mature enough" to choose or that the particular child's choice
is "right." To introduce such a subjective process for decision would be not to
emancipate the child but rather to transfer to the state the parental control and
responsibility for determining when to consult and abide by the child's choice.
Id. at 662-63.
121. LAURA M. PURDY, IN THEiR BEST INTERESTS? 12 (1992) (arguing that a reevaluation of children's rights should not depend solely on children's "intrinsic characteristics" because what children "need and want depends in part on social conditions and social ideals").
122. Id. at 225.
123. Id. at 225-26.
124. For a brief discussion of privacy right ideology, see supra notes 46-53 and accompanying text.
125. See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Privacy v. Equality: Beyond Roe v. Wade, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 93, 96 (1987). MacKinnon contends that the abortion rights cases have
actually "translate[d] the ideology of the private sphere into the individual woman's legal
right to privacy as a means of subordinating women's collective needs to the imperatives of
male supremacy." Id. at 97.
126. See id. at 94-97.
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way (because of lack of money or unavailability of a doctor who will
perform an abortion) and what one should be able to avoid needing
(through birth control or abstinence).
Likewise, a rule that simply extends the right to choose an abortion to pregnant teenagers would not address the reasons that many
teenage girls become pregnant when they do not want to have children, or the problems of teenage mothers, or the difficulty in obtaining an abortion if one is alone, without funds, and without access to
a doctor who will perform one. It would simply extend to pregnant
teenagers the legal presumption that they are autonomous actors,
making decisions and shaping their lives on a more or less equal
basis with other autonomous actors.
Of course nothing now prevents state legislatures from passing
laws genuinely meant to aid young girls in making a decision or to
help their families cope with the situation. Such laws, if devised and
administered with genuine attention and concern, might be a good
thing. For example, a state that wanted to ensure that an unmarried
pregnant minor would not feel pressured into aborting her pregnancy
out of financial need or fear of parental hostility might provide financial aid for her and her family or noncoercive family counselling
services. That mandated parental involvement statutes without exception deal only with abortion and not with childbirth betrays the true
agenda. Considering the far greater financial and physical commitment
involved in giving birth as opposed to aborting a pregnancy, and thus
the greater risks involved, it would make more sense to require parental involvement in an unmarried teenager's decision to give birth
than in her decision to terminate a pregnancy. 2 ' The legislatures
that pass parental involvement laws are clearly interested not in protecting teenagers or their families but in hindering abortion.
This is exactly why the Supreme Court should extend to pregnant minors the full effects of the holding in Roe v. Wade. The ideology of the privacy right may not help young people face life's difficulties, but at least it would prevent government from making them
worse for no good reason.

127. PURDY, supra note 121, at 226 (arguing that "the case for required consultation with
an informed adult is far stronger if a girl wants to stay pregnant and put the baby up for
adoption or keep it").
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VI. CONCLUSION

Under current law, state or local government may mandate parental consent or notification prior to a minor's abortion as long as
the minor has access to an alternative form of official authorization.
The reliance of this bypass procedure on the separation of minors into
two groups---"mature" and "immature"-is in a way a logical extension of the ideology of the privacy right, as seen through a philosophy of children's rights that ties parental and state authority to the
child's need for guidance and protection. However, in practice the
bypass option is unnecessary, unworkable, and a pretext for burdens
on pregnant teenagers who seek abortion that would be unconstitutional if placed on adult women. The persistence of the bypass option
despite these flaws is perhaps partly explained by its apparent congruity with the assumptions underlying the privacy right and the nature
of children, and by its apparent function as a compromise between
the tradition of legal deference to parental authority on the one hand
and the personal and highly consequential nature of the abortion/childbirth decision on the other. In the end, though, continued
reliance on it by the courts and legislatures is unjustifiable. As long
as the privacy right is recognized as the basis for a woman's right to
choose abortion, that right should be extended equally to pregnant
women regardless of age.
Satsie Veith
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